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The Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Advisory 
Board (PCAOB), which “oversees the audits of public companies and SEC-registered brokers and 
dealers in order to protect investors and further the public interest” (PCAOB, 2020). One of the 
provisions included in SOX replaced the previous self-regulated peer-review program with an 
inspection process controlled by the agency.  The revised process aimed to protect the interests of 
investors and improve auditor credibility (Robertson, 2010). As part of this process, inspection 
staff review an audit firm’s quality control system and evaluate audit procedures performed on a 
sample of engagements (Abbot et al. 2016).   Inspections are performed annually for large firms 
(>100 clients) and triennially for smaller audit firms (<100 clients). The PCAOB inspects 
registered firms to assess their level of compliance with “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the rules of the 
Board, the rules of the SEC, and professional standards in connection with the firm’s performance 
of audits” (PCAOB, 2020). 
The outcome of the inspection process is a publicly available report. Part I of the report 
summarizes audit deficiencies identified through the inspection process.  This includes 
deficiencies of such significance that it appeared the firm did not have enough evidence to support 
its opinion on the financial statements of ICFR (Guide to Reading the PCAOB…).  Part II provides 
observations related to the audit firm’s quality control systems. Quality control criticisms can be 
related to independence, personal management, client acceptance, engagement performance, and 
monitoring. (“Inspection Procedures). Quality control criticisms are revealed in the public report 
only if the firm fails to address the criticisms to the Board’s satisfaction within 12 months of the 
issuance of the original report (“Inspection Procedures”).  
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The PCAOB affirms that the purpose of the inspection process is “to accurately assess, 
drive improvement in, and communicate audit quality” (PCAOB, 2020) They warn against 
extrapolating results to draw large conclusions on the quality of audit firms. Despite this warning, 
prior research shows in the following section that there is a significant market response to the 
release of inspection reports, suggesting investors may view reports as a significant signal of audit 
quality. While prior research has examined the market’s reaction to PCAOB inspection reports, 
these studies were completed prior to changes in the report’s format.  The objective of this study 
is to provide new evidence on whether the redesigned PCAOB inspection reports affect the 
market’s perception of audit quality.  Specifically, I examine whether clients of auditors with a 
greater number of identified deficiencies suffer more adverse market reactions when an inspection 
report is released.   
 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
PCAOB Inspection Reports 
The inspection report process has undergone multiple revisions, with the most recent 
occurring in 2018. Beginning in 2018 the PCAOB developed a new inspection report intended to 
meet the needs of their stakeholders more effectively. Per the PCAOB, this new report improves 
readability for investors and other stakeholders, uses data tools to improve accessibility, and 
reduces the use of technical language (PCOAB, 2018). It is divided into five parts: introduction, 
overview of historical data, inspection observations, quality control observations, and the firm’s 
response to the draft inspection report (PCAOB, 2018). The introduction section offers investors 
and other readers a high-level overview of firm’s compliance with PCAOB requirements. The 
overview of historical data sections previously included one year of data for annually inspected 
4 
 
firms but was updated to include three years. This increases comparability and recognizes temporal 
changes in scope and process, which increases understandability. The inspection observations 
section is divided into two sub-sections, Part I.A and Part I.B. Part I.A. provides a summary of 
audits inspected and discusses those that were found to have unsupported opinions This discussion 
includes a description of the deficiency and an assessment of the relative significance or nature of 
the accounts/disclosures affected. Part I.A provides a breakdown of deficiencies by category, for 
example, “revenue recognition” or “related-party relationship transactions.” This ensures that the 
most relevant information is displayed first. (“PCAOB posts Guide to Reading the PCAOB's New 
Inspection Report.”, (2018)). Part I. B. identifies other instances of non-compliance that may not 
have caused insufficient information for an unqualified opinion, but nevertheless violated PCAOB 
rules and standards. This new addition to the report looks to increase transparency, thereby 
increasing investor confidence and improving auditor credibility.  
The next section of the inspection report summarizes observations related to the audit 
firm’s quality control systems. These observations are generally negative and relate to weaknesses 
in the firm’s systems.  For each observation, prior to the issuance of the report, firms are given the 
opportunity to respond to these concerns within a 12-month period after the draft report is issued, 
but if no action is taken, the deficiency is issued publicly. The final section of the report is the 
Appendix, which can include a written statement from the firm in response to the inspection report 
if they choose to provide one. 
PCAOB Inspection Reports as a Measure of Audit Quality 
The primary purpose of an audit is to provide an independent verification that the financial 
statements of a company are, in all material respects, in accordance with GAAP. In addition to 
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providing assurance, a high-quality audit increases the integrity of funded programs, identifies 
possible non-compliance issues, reduces the risk of future non-compliance, and increases goodwill 
among taxpayers, donors, and other key stakeholders (AICPA, 2018). A high-quality audit can 
reduce agency costs and information asymmetry which supports credibility for managers in the 
eyes of shareholders. It can also improve earnings quality and provide more useful and reliable 
information to capital markets (Huang and Kang, 2015). Conversely, the consequences of a low-
quality audit can include restatements, litigation, and going-concern opinions that negatively 
impact investors (Huang and Kang, 2015).  Because of these positive and negative effects, audit 
quality is a primary determinant of auditor selection and is meaningful to investors and 
stakeholders. 
PCAOB inspection reports have the potential to be used as a measure of audit quality 
(Aobdia, 2019). Both audit professionals and investors, “associate fewer identified audit 
deficiencies with higher audit quality” (Christensen 2016, pg. 4). This view is held by most of each 
group; “75.3 percent of auditors and 65.4 percent of investors associate fewer inspection findings 
by the PCAOB with higher audit quality” (Christensen 2016, pg. 29). In addition, PCAOB 
inspection reports change investor’s perceptions of audit quality (Offermanns 2011). The size-
adjusted stock returns of clients audited by inspected firms exhibit abnormal variances during the 
period around the release date of the inspection report, suggesting that investors use the reports to 
make decisions.  Suggesting investors’ perceptions might be accurate, Gunny and Zhang (2013) 
find that PCAOB inspection reports that reported significant deficiencies were indicative of lower 
audit quality, reflected in a greater number of restatements and higher levels of abnormal current 
accruals. Robertson, Stefeniak, and Houston (2014) find PCAOB inspection reports, and the 
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related investor response can ultimately lead to an increased likelihood executive will consider 
switching auditors. 
While there are evidence PCAOB inspection reports are a measure of audit quality used by 
investors and other parties, not all evidence supports this conclusion. Lennox and Pittman (2010) 
find the market share of audit firms is insensitive to the issuance of a negative PCAOB inspection 
report. The study asserts that “if audit clients view PCAOB reports as being informative about 
differences in audit firm quality … clients would appoint (dismiss) audit firms that receive 
favorable (unfavorable) reports” (Lennox and Pittman, 2010, pg. 85).  The authors suggest the 
reports lack of informational value may be due to the fact: (1) they do not provide an overall 
“opinion” on the quality of the firm, and (2) they do not disclose information related to the firm’s 
quality control system.  
Nagy (2014) supports Lennox and Pittman’s conclusion that the lack of public disclosure 
of quality control criticisms within the PCAOB inspection report results in the lack of 
informational value to investors and clients. The study suggests PCAOB inspection reports have 
limited information value because contemporaneous quality control criticisms are not included. 
DeFond (2010) finds that the PCAOB inspection reports are less informative than pre-SOX Peer 
Reviews and poses PCAOB inspections are not representative, as they target the riskiest audits for 
review.  
HYPOTHESIS 
The PCAOB did not implement the inspection process for the sole purpose of providing 
value-relevant information toto investors and clients; the primary objective is to maintain audit 
quality. Despite the PCAOB’s intentions, because findings are publicly revealed, investors and 
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clients may utilize inspection reports as a signal of audit quality. Prior research on the value 
relevance of PCAOB inspection reports is mixed, and there have been substantial updates to the 
PCAOB inspection report process and presentation since prior studies were published.  
Responding to this gap in the extant literature, this study examines the market response to PCAOB 
inspection reports, 
The expectation is the market’s reaction to PCAOB inspection reports will vary with the 
content of the reports.  Specifically, the reaction will be significantly worse when the findings in 
the inspection report are more negative.  This expectation is supported by prior literature. There 
are prior evidence investors react to the release of the reports (Aobdia, 2019) and perceive more 
inspection findings as an indication of worse audit quality (Christensen 2016).  This leads to the 
hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
 
H1: Clients of an auditor with more deficiencies in their PCAOB inspection report will 
experience a more negative (or less positive) market reaction to the report’s release. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
For the 20 largest audit firms in the period from 2010 to 2020, I obtain data from the 
publicly available inspection reports on the PCAOB’s website. For each inspection report I 
manually code the report’s content.  Information from the report is then matched with client 
information from Compustat.  I then drop clients without auditor information in Audit Analytics 
and price information on CRSP. This selection methodology yields a sample of 43,307 client firm-








     
Observations in Compustat for the period 2010 - 2020  123,181  
Less:   
Companies not matched with PCAOB inspected auditor  (43,449) 
Companies without necessary CRSP  (36,425) 
   
Final Sample  43,307  
   
Note: PCAOB inspection data was not available because either the auditor did not have a unique identified in 
Compustat, or the auditor was not one of the top 20 largest auditors of public companies. 
 
 
 To examine the hypothesis, I define the variable CAR as the average of firms’ value 
weighted cumulative abnormal returns over a 5-day period (t-2 through t+2) surrounding the 
inspection report release date. I then define DEF_PCT by taking the total # of deficient audits 
identified in an inspection report and dividing by the total # of audits reviewed. To test the 
hypotheses, I examine whether CAR varies between clients of auditors with a high deficiency 
percentage and clients of auditors with a low deficiency percentage.  The binary variable 
MED_DEF_PCT is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor with a deficiency percentage 
(DEF_PCT) greater than the median value, and 0 otherwise.  The binary variable Q4_DEF_PCT 
is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor with a deficiency percentage (DEF_PCT) in the upper 
quartile, and 0 otherwise.   
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.  The average firm engages an auditor 
that had deficiencies identified for approximately 34 percent of inspected engagements 
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(DEF_PCT).  The mean value of CAR is zero, suggesting the average firm does not experience an 
abnormal market reaction to the release of their auditor’s inspection report. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The first hypothesis suggests the value of CAR will be significantly lower for firms that 
engage an auditor with more deficiencies in their PCAOB inspection report. To test the hypothesis, 
I conduct a t-test to examine differences between clients of auditors with a deficiency percentage 
above the median value (MED_DEF_PCT = 1)and clients of auditors with a deficiency percentage 
below the median value (MED_DEF_PCT = 0). Results, presented in Panel A of Table 3, show 
firms the engaged auditors with a lower deficiency percentage (MED_DEF_PCT = 0), experienced 
average abnormal returns of 0.0066 during the 5-day period surrounding the release of the PCAOB 
inspection report. For firms that engaged auditors with a greater deficiency percentage 
(MED_DEF_PCT = 1), the mean value of CAR is .0018. Critically, the difference between the two 
reactions is significant (p < 0.01).  Consistent with H1, this suggests firms that engage an auditor 
with a greater deficiency percentage experience lower cumulative abnormal returns around the 
report’s release. 
Panel B of Table 3 compares the mean value of CAR for clients that engage auditors into 
upper quartile of DEF_PCT (Q4_DEF_PCT = 1) against those in the lower three quartiles 
(Q4_DEF_PCT = 0). For firms in the upper quartile, the mean value of CAR is .0005 and for firms 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
       
       
Variable n Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev. 
DEF_PCT 43,307 0.34 0.33 0.15 0.24 0.43 
CAR 43,307 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.02 
       
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample comprising 43,307 firm-year observations.  All variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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in the lower three quartiles, the mean value of CAR is 0.0052.  The difference between the two 
groups is significant (p < 0.01).  In both Panel A and Panel B the results support H1; clients of an 
auditor with more deficiencies in their PCAOB inspection report experience a lower abnormal 
return around the report’s release. 
Table 3 
Tests of Differences 
Panel A: Median Split 
 FULL SAMPLE 
  Obs. Mean CAR 
MED_DEF_PCT=0 19,539 0.0066  
MED_DEF_PCT=1 23,868 0.0018  
   
Difference  (0.0048) 
  *** 
Panel B: Fourth Quartile Split     
 FULL SAMPLE 
A_O_PRESS Obs. Mean CAR 
Q4_DEF_PCT=0 32084 0.0052  
Q4_DEF_PCT=1 11223 0.0005  
   
Difference  (0.0047) 
  *** 
   
      
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variable CAR.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test.  See Appendix A for a detailed description of all variables.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 This study examines the market’s reaction to PCAOB inspection reports, and whether this 
reaction varies with report content.  The results show the average client experiences positive 
abnormal returns are the release of their auditor’s inspection report.  This reaction varies, firms 
that engage an auditor with a higher percentage of deficiencies within their PCAOB inspection 
reports experience lower cumulative abnormal returns to the report’s release than firms that engage 
an auditor with a lower percentage of deficiencies within their PCAOB inspection reports. Taken 
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as a whole, the results suggest the market responds to inspection reports, and the response is 
informed by the report’s content. This indicates that investors perceive the reports to be a 
meaningful signal of audit quality.  
The results of this study should be of interest to several parties. First, the results add new 
evidence to a robust stream of literature and therefore should be of interest to academics.  While 
prior research on the information content of PCAOB inspection reports provide mixed results, my 
study uses a more recent sample and finds inspection reports are perceived to be an indication of 
audit quality.  Second, this study should be of interest to regulators. Regulators have warned 
against extrapolating results from inspections and drawing large conclusions on the quality of audit 
firms (PCAOB 2020). My results suggest this warning has not stopped investors from reacting the 
content of inspection reports.  Finally, this study should be of interest to auditors and their clients.  
The results suggest there are salient consequences to poor PCAOB inspection reports.  This should 
provide auditors motivation to maintain high audit quality, and client’s motivation to consider 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions (Alphabetical) 
CAR 
The average of firms’ value weighted cumulative abnormal returns over a 
5-day period (t-2 through t+2) surrounding the inspection report release 
date. 
DEF_PCT 
Indicator variable equal to the total # of deficient audits identified in an 
inspection report divided by the total # of audits reviewed 
MED_DEF_PCT 
Binary variable MED_DEF_PCT is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor 
with a deficiency percentage (DEF_PCT) greater than the median value, 
and 0 otherwise 
Q4_DEF_PCT 
Binary variable Q4_DEF_PCT is coded 1 if a client engages an auditor 
with a deficiency percentage (DEF_PCT) in the upper quartile, and 0 
otherwise 
 
  
